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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000312

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [KISL](#) [UG](#) [SO](#) [SU](#) [CD](#) [AU](#)
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI
FOCUSES ON SOMALIA, DARFUR, AND CHAD

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO. REASON: 1.4 (B), (D).

11. (C) SUMMARY. President Museveni confirmed that he had appointed a force commander to lead Ugandan peace-keeping troops who were ready to deploy to Somalia as soon as February 1, immediately after obtaining parliamentary approval. Their mission would be to support Somalia's Transitional Federal Government and to provide training, but not to disarm Somalis, which was best left to the Somalis themselves. Discussing domestic affairs, Museveni dismissed the Lord's Resistance Army's (LRA) call for a new mediator to replace Riek Machar, and said Uganda would continue military operations against the LRA in order to maintain "pressure" for political dialogue. Criticizing Sudan's Government of National Unity as "Arab chauvinists" bent on the "extermination" of the people of Darfur, Museveni appealed for greater international assistance to Darfur, as well as greater U.S. engagement with both Chad and the Central African Republic. He affirmed Uganda's opposition to Sudanese President Bashir's candidacy for AU Assembly Chairman, and indicated support for an East African alternative, possibly Tanzanian President Kikwete. END SUMMARY.

12. (U) On January 28 on the margins of the African Union Summit, A/S Frazer met with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who was accompanied by Ugandan Ambassador to Ethiopia and PermRep to the African Union Edith Grace Ssempala and Ugandan embassy staff. U.S. PermRep to the AU (USAU) Ambassador Courville, USAU Military Advisor Colonel Timothy Rainey, AF/SPG Director Lauren Landis, AF Special Assistant Fatuma Sanneh, and deputy pol-econ counselor Eric Wong (note-taker) accompanied A/S Frazer.

UGANDA READY TO DEPLOY TO SOMALIA WITHIN DAYS

13. (C) President Museveni said Ugandan troops were ready to deploy to Somalia (as part of the AU Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM) as soon as February 1 or 2, immediately following parliamentary approval anticipated on January 30. Their primary mission would be to support Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), as well as to provide training to Somalis. Amb. Ssempala observed that the AU, IGAD, TFG, and

potential troop contributing countries planned to meet the following week; Museveni said he hoped Uganda would have deployed by then.

14. (C) Disarmament was a delicate task best left to the Somalis themselves, not to outside parties, Museveni said, observing that even women fighters would have to be disarmed.

While Ugandan troops could counter an isolated insurgency "in the bush," a general insurgency would be more challenging. Museveni recalled that as OAU chair, he had visited warlord Mohammed Farah Aided in Mogadishu, and had advised then-President George H.W. Bush to focus on humanitarian delivery of food and thus generate goodwill, rather than to pursue Aided. Somalis, under the "Mad Mullah," had fought against the UK for 20 years, Museveni added. He highlighted that Ugandan troops had experience in Somalia, having fought there twice: against Italy in the Second World War, and as one of the contingents of the UK's colonial-era King's African Rifles.

15. (C) A/S Frazer noted that the USG was providing USD 19 million to support AMISOM, and that a stabilization force would help create conditions conducive to dialogue. The USG was also pushing the EU to release funds earmarked for Somalia from the EU's African Peace Facility, despite opposition from EU Development Commissioner Louis Michel, who sought to condition their release on political dialogue and the restoration of impeached TFG Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan. Italy also sought conditionality, but had offered humanitarian support for the TFG. While attacks on Ethiopian forces had occurred, Somali community leaders, including the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr sub-clan, had said they would welcome peace-keepers. The Somali people appreciated

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the role Uganda played in the past as IGAD chair, she added.

16. (C) In response to Museveni's comment that AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare appeared to have doubts about deployment in Somalia, Frazer noted that AU Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit had formally requested support for AMISOM from both AU member states and partners. Nigeria and Malawi were ready to deploy, and Burundi would provide a battalion; South Africa would provide financing and possibly planners, although the USG was pushing for equipment; Mozambique was a possible troop contributor; and Tanzania had not yet responded. Amb. Courville observed that Egypt and Algeria may provide funds; Algeria may provide airlift, as it was constitutionally prohibited from deploying. Museveni noted that the Ugandan force commander appointed to lead Uganda's contingent could lead other national contingents as well.

17. (C) Despite having five million Somalis among its population, Ethiopia had a history of "mishandling" its relationship with Somalia, Museveni said. Discussing the four major African language groups (Afro-Asiatic, Niger-Congo, Nilo-Saharan, and Khoi-San), Museveni observed that Somalis, Oromos, ancient Egyptians, and peoples of both southern Sudan and southern Ethiopia all belonged to the Nilo-Saharan group; while west and central African peoples, including Bantus, belonged to the Niger-Congo. Uganda was thus a "bridge" between the Niger-Congo and Nilo-Saharan groups, he concluded. Uganda's "pan-African" polity differentiated only between "Africans and non-Africans," not among Africans themselves, Museveni added, explaining that this was why Uganda provided refuge to Rwandan expatriates.

UGANDA TO CONTINUE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST LRA

18. (C) Museveni dismissed the Lord's Resistance Army's (LRA) call for a new mediator in Kenya as a delaying tactic, as a new mediator would require time for instruction. It was preferable to reinforce efforts by Sudanese mediator Riek

Machar, who knew the issues well, Museveni said. Museveni added that he had told UN Special Envoy Joaquim Chissano that if the LRA sought an infusion of new representatives or mediators, then Uganda would resume military operations against the LRA. Continued military operations, in conjunction with political dialogue, was necessary to place pressure on the LRA, Museveni said; dialogue "without pressure" was useless.

¶9. (C) Museveni rejected direct talks with Vincent Otti, asserting that the LRA was "not serious," and had been misled by the NGO Pax Christi. LRA leaders needed to decide whether they valued their life as much as the funding they received from NGOs, he said. Uganda was pursuing a "concept of operations plus talks, not operations plus holiday," Museveni declared, adding that he had dispatched a military commander to consult with one of DRC President Kabila's.

DARFUR FACES "EXTERMINATION" BY "ARAB CHAUVINISTS"

¶10. (C) Museveni strongly criticized the Government of Sudan as "Arab chauvinists" responsible for "ethnic cleansing" in Darfur, who sought to "clean out the blacks and replace them with Arabs." Citing 1948 census results that found Sudan to be an "Afro-Arab" country comprised of a 69 per cent African majority, and a 31 per cent Arab minority, he said "Nilotics in the north," who were "Muslim but not Arab," were "being butchered." Uganda had intervened on behalf of blacks in southern Sudan, resulting in Khartoum's agreement to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), he said, but the people of Darfur lacked the same international support. "Something should be done, or else they will be exterminated," Museveni said. He noted that he had asked Nigerian President Obasanjo to intervene to defend Darfurians, but that Obasanjo had been too pre-occupied with domestic politics to engage in

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"extra-curricular activities." Museveni appealed for USG assistance for the people of Darfur, so they could decide themselves whether to join the Government of Southern Sudan or support authorities in Khartoum.

¶11. (C) Museveni expressed regret that Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) First Vice President Salva Kiir lacked the dynamism of the late John Garang. Whereas Garang had believed himself capable of winning national elections and transforming Sudan, current SPLM leaders were only "southern separatists." Bemoaning that under the CPA, the GNU in Khartoum retained control over Sudan's foreign affairs, Museveni stressed the importance of getting southern Sudan "out of Arab control," in order to shift "the front line between blacks and Arabs" north, away from Sudan's border with Uganda.

¶12. (C) A/S Frazer detailed USG efforts to strengthen capacity and military capability of the 7,000-strong AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), adding that AU Commission Chairperson Konare and UN SYG Moon had recently sent a joint letter to Sudanese President Bashir regarding the UN heavy support package (HSP) agreed to during November 2006 AU-UN-GOS consultations in Addis Ababa. Frazer highlighted the need to push for immediate deployment of UN enablers to link up with AMIS battalions; the UN's assertion that 480 days were needed before deployment was unacceptable. The USG had long ago proposed NATO support for AMIS, but had met resistance from the AU. The USG advocated a hybrid UN-AU force for Darfur, and sought to provide AMIS with as much capability as possible; the USG was also pushing the UN to develop a force in Chad, she said.

EAST AFRICA, NOT BASHIR, SHOULD HOLD AU CHAIRMANSHIP

¶13. (C) A/S Frazer said that Charge Hume had been instructed to suggest to Sudanese Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail that he advise President Bashir not to seek to become AU Assembly Chairman; and noted that were Bashir to become AU Chairman, then Sudan would hold two positions in the UN-AU-GOS tripartite mechanism on transition to a hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur. Amb. Ssempala confirmed that Tanzanian President Kikwete had accepted serving as an alternate candidate, but was being intimidated by Sudan; someone would also have to object explicitly to Bashir's candidacy. Remarking, "It's East Africa's turn," Museveni declared his opposition to Bashir and instructed Ssempala to object at the AU.

SUSPICION OF ARAB STATES' INTENT

¶14. (C) Museveni said that "Arabs" were the "so-called member states" who objected to more robust action in Darfur. With only a few exceptions, AU member states were either "puppets of Europeans or Arabs." Egypt was "always creating confusion," he said. Even Libyan leader Qaddafi's "African revolution" was only "Arab chauvinism". "We are friends but at loggerheads," Museveni said. Eritrea, despite its problems, was "not a puppet," but had made a mistake in seeking independence from Ethiopia; Museveni said he had counseled President Isiaias against independence, as "it was not necessary." Observing that President Bush was a good ally but "diverted by Iraq," Museveni questioned why Sunni-Shia dialogue was not being promoted to encourage power-sharing. A/S Frazer responded that in addition to intimidation by domestic opponents, Iraqis seeking to participate in the political process also had to contend with foreign fighters and international terrorists.

URGING STRONGER U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH CHAD AND C.A.R.

¶15. (C) Museveni urged "direct action" by the United States

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in Chad, as well as more robust political engagement in the Central African Republic. Both Chad and the C.A.R. suffered from a "vacuum filled by Sudanese intimidation and Qaddafi," he said. Chadian President Deby's Zagawa tribe was present in both Chad and Darfur, and Sudan sought to "intimidate" both Chad and Uganda. Chad suffered from a weak state structure, as France did not allow it to develop independent capacity, he added. Deby was not secure enough to "defy" Qaddafi, and therefore needed to be emboldened by greater engagement by the United States. A/S Frazer responded that the USG sought such engagement: the Secretary had met with the Chadian foreign minister in November, and Presidential Envoy Natsios had recently met Deby in Chad. The USG was already providing counter-terrorism training to Chad, and may consider a JCET exercise in eastern Chad. Noting that UNSCR 1706 authorized the deployment of protection forces in Chad for refugees from Sudan, Frazer observed that such forces could also help train francophone gendarmes in Chad. Museveni responded by proposing a presidential visit by Deby to Washington, saying it was important to meet with Deby himself, not his "Arab" foreign minister. Museveni also offered to dispatch a ministerial delegation to consult with Deby about closer engagement with the United States.

¶16. (C) Museveni asserted that French military intervention on behalf of the C.A.R. government occurred only after Uganda offered to intervene against Sudan-sponsored insurgents. Museveni said President Chirac had initially agreed to Uganda deploying to the C.A.R., with French financial support, but later changed his mind, on the margins of the December 2006 Forum on Sino-African Cooperation in Beijing.

¶17. (C) COMMENT: President Museveni's extended remarks on

the struggle between "Arabs" and "Africans" underscore the cultural fault lines dividing African states on the issue of Darfur, President Bashir's candidacy for AU Chairman, and whether to intervene in Somalia. Museveni's arguments for continuing military operations against the LRA, as well his determination to deploy against the remnants of the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia, suggest that he subscribes to Clausewitz's conviction that "war is the extension of diplomacy by other means." END COMMENT.

118. (U) A/S Frazer cleared this cable.
YAMAMOTO